Land & Water Law Review
Volume 16

Issue 1

Article 5

1981

Natural Resources - Commerce Clause - State Market
Participation Exempt from Commerce Clause Review - Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake
Leon T. Vance

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Vance, Leon T. (1981) "Natural Resources - Commerce Clause - State Market Participation Exempt from
Commerce Clause Review - Reeves, Inc. v. Stake," Land & Water Law Review: Vol. 16 : Iss. 1 , pp. 85 - 100.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss1/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Vance: Natural Resources - Commerce Clause - State Market Participation
CLAUSE-State Market Participation
NATURAL RESOURCES-COMMERCE
U.S.
Exempt from Commerce Clause Review. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 100 S.Ct. 2271 (1980).

In 1919, critical shortages of cement' in South Dakota
moved its legislature to establish the South Dakota Cement
Commission. By the early 1920's the Commission had
established and was operating the South Dakota Cement
Plant. The state-owned plant soon produced enough cement
to alleviate the shortages, so the Commission began selling
cement to purchasers from other states. It continued to sell
to purchasers from nine other states for more than fifty
years. Between 1970 and 1977 the South Dakota Cement
Plant sold approximately forty percent of its output to nonresident purchasers, including the petitioner, Reeves, Inc.,
a Wyoming ready-mix concrete distributor.
In the summer of 1978, heavy demand created a cement
shortage and prevented the plant from filling all of its
orders. The Cement Commission therefore reaffirmed a
policy of first supplying all South Dakota customers and
honoring all contract commitments, selling any remaining
volume on a first come, first served basis. Reeves had no
contract with the plant, but had purchased niney-five percent
of its cement from the plant for 20 years. The plant consequently refused to sell cement to Reeves. Since it could find
no other suppliers, Reeves was forced to cut production by
seventy-six percent.2
Reeves challenged the resident preference policy in
federal district court. On commerce clause grounds, the
court enjoined the Cement Commission from applying the
policy to Reeves.' The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, relying on Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp.," reversed, holding that the commerce clause does not
limit a state's "power to choose whether, to whom, and on
what conditions to sell its goods." 5 The Supreme Court
Copyright@ 1981 by the University of Wyoming

1. Cement is a finely ground and baked powder, commonly made from limestone and clay or shale. Cement is mixed with a sand or stone aggregate
and water to make concrete. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA 1075-76 (1974).
2. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, - U.S. _-,100 S.Ct. 2271, 2274-2275 (1980).
3. Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, No. 78-5060 (D.S.D. July 21, 1978).
4. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976)

in text as Alexandria Scrap].
5. Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, 586 F.2d 1230; 1233 (8th Cir. 1978).
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granted Reeves' petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment
of the Eighth Circuit, and remanded the case for further
consideration due to the Court's recent decision in Hughes v.
Oklahoma.' On remand, the court of appeals distinguished
Hughes v. Oklahoma and again upheld the South Dakota
policy.7 The Supreme Court again granted Reeves' petition
for certiorari.'
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether South
Dakota, acting in a proprietary capacity as a free market
participant, in time of shortage could confine the sale of
its cement to its residents free from the strictures of the
commerce clause. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice
Blackmun, the Court held that it could, relying on the general
rule of Alexandria Scrap: "[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence
of congressional action, from participating in the market
and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.""
COMMERCE CLAUSE BACKGROUND

The commerce clause grants to Congress the power
"[to] regulate Commerce . . .among the several States."

°

The Supreme Court has long interpreted this grant of power
to act concomitantly as a limit on the power of the states to
obstruct interstate trade, whether or not Congress has acted
within the area." Nevertheless, when there is no conflicting
federal legislation, states do retain some authority under
their police powers to regulate matters of "legitimate local
concern," even though interstate commerce may be bur6. Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, 441 U.S. 939 (1979). In Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322 (1979), the Court invoked the commerce clause to strike down
an Oklahoma statute that prevented shipping or selling outside of Oklahoma,
minnows that were caught within the state. The Court denounced the fiction
of state ownership of wild game. Id., at 338-339. In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
supra note 2, at 2275 n. 4, the Court recognized that South Dakota owned
the cement in fact, so Hughes v. Oklahoma was not controlling.
7. Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, 603 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1979).
100 S. Ct. 700 (1980).
U.S.
8. Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley,
9. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, supra note 2, at 2277. quoting Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., supra note 4, at 810. Joining with Justice Blackmun. in the
majority opinion were Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, Marshall,
and Rehnquist. Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices
Brennan, White, and Stevens joined.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, clause 3.
100 S. Ct. 2009,
U.S.
11. Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc.,
2015 (1980) ; H.P. Hood and Sons v. Dumond, 336 U.S. 525,. 534-538 (1949).
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dened.' 2 The conservation of natural resources has been held
to be a legitimate local concern where regulation to that
effect applied equally to intrastate and interstate consumers."3 Whatever the local purpose, though, the Court has
repeatedly warned against a state placing itself in a "position
of economic isolation."4

In commerce clause cases, the Court traditionally has
distinguished between state regulation that creates a barrier
to interstate commerce and that which creates a burden
but does not discriminate." A regulatory barrier erected
for the purpose of economic protectionism is "virtually
per se [invalid],"" while state action that places burdens
evenhandedly generally is scrutinized under guidelines such
as those enumerated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.: (1) is
the regulation evenhanded, with only incidental effects on
interstate commerce, or discriminatory; (2) does the regulation serve a legitimate local purpose; and (3) could that
purpose be served as well without discriminating against
interstate commerce?'
THE PRINCIPAL PRECEDENT FOR REEVES, INC. V. STAKE

Although cement is manufactured, it is basically a
combination of limestone and clay that could be considered
a natural resource." Under the Pike "balancing test", and
earlier formulations, the Court held that a state could not
conserve its natural resources by reserving them for their
residents at the expense of interstate commerce.' 9 The feature
distinguishing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake from those cases, however, was that South Dakota had not enacted any discrim12. Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978).
13. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186-188

(1950).

14. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935).
15. Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., supra note 11, at 2015; Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-624 (1978).
16. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra note 15, at 624.
17. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) [hereinafter cited in
text as Pike]. This test has been applied repeatedly throughout the last
decade. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, supra note
12, at 441-442; Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,
432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
18. See note 1, supra.
19. Hughes v. Oklahoma, upra note 6, at 338; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553, 598-99 (1923) ; West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229,

255 (1911).
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inatory legislation; rather, while acting in a proprietary
capacity, it made a market decision to prefer South Dakota
purchasers."0 The Court, therefore, squarely based its decision
2
on the singular case of Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.
In an opinion by Justice Powell, the Court in Alexandria
Scrap refused to apply traditional commerce clause analysis
to the Maryland legislation because the state had entered
the market itself and influenced it through subsidies which
supplemented natural market forces." The Court dealt with
the case as one of first impression and concluded that a
state's entry into the market, even if the state then chose to
favor its own citizens, was not even within the purview of
the commerce clause." According to the Court, there was
therefore no need to examine state market participation
with traditional commerce clause scrutiny.24
In his dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the conclusion
that state purchasing activities were not within the contemplation of the commerce clause.
In the absence of some limiting principal this is
a disturbing conclusion, for little imagination is
required to foresee future state actions "set[ting]
barrier[s] to traffic between one state and another"
20. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, supra note 2, at 2275 [hereinafter cited in text as
Reeves].
21. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, supra note 2, at 2279, 2282. Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., supra note 4, at 796-802, involved a subsidy that Maryland
paid to scrap automobile processors as an incentive to clear abandoned automobiles from the countryside. In order to limit the subsidies spent on scrap
autos abandoned in surrounding states and in order to encourage processing
within Maryland, the state made documentation requirements stricter for
processors outside of Maryland. The effect of that action was to reduce the
flow of scrap autos out of the state.
22. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., supra note 4, at 806-810. Joining with
Justice Powell were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun,
and Rehnquist. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices White and Marshall joined.
23. Id. at 807-810.
24. Id. at 809. The Court had previously summarily affirmed a lower court
decision allowing a state to favor its own citizens when purchasing services
for its own end use. American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
The lower court held that statutes specifying the conditions of state purchases dealt with proprietary activities that are not subject to commerce
clause restrictions. American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 725
(N.D. Fla. 1972). The majority in Alexandria Scrap gave no notice to that
case, but the dissent did distinguish it. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
supra note 4, at 821 (dissenting opinion).
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.... This can surely occur if all state action is to
be immunized from further analysis merely ... by

the State's becoming in some sense a "purchaser".2 5
In 1980, Reeves, with the modification of the state acting
as a seller, presented the Court with just such a foreseeable
problem.
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

In Reeves, the principal drafters of Alexandria Scrap's

"market participant" analysis, Justice Powell for the majority and Justice Stevens in concurrence, dissented.2" Despite
that significant voting shift, Justice Blackmun's opinion for
the majority reaffirmed the distinction Alexandria Scrap
made between states as market participants and states as
market regulators.27 Since South Dakota qualified as a
market participant, its action was free from commerce
clause restraints.2 8 Furthermore, the Court noted that considerations of state sovereignty and fairness required providing South Dakota with the benefits, as well as the burdens,
of free market participation.29 In the main, however, the
Court simply applied the "general rule" of Alexandria Scrap:
in the absence of congressional action, the commerce clause
does not prohibit a state from participating in the market
and favoring its own citizens over non-residents. °
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

The Court in Reeves failed to refine the rule set forth
in Alexandria Scrap beyond clearly expanding it to include
sales by the state, as well as purchases or subsidies. Once
it determined that the rule in Alexandria Scrap applied, the
Court rather summarily responded to Reeves' arguments."1
Certainly no limiting principles were imposed on the broad
"market participant" exemption from commerce clause
25. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap, Corp., supra note 4, at 828-29 (dissenting
opinion) citing Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., stpra note 14, at 521.
26. Reeves, inc. v. Stake, supra note 2, at 2282.
27. Id. at 2277.
28. Id. at 2279.
29. Id. at 2278-2279.
80. Id. at 2277, 2279.
81. Id. at 2279-2282.
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scrutiny. The majority's perfunctory treatment of Reeves
belies the confusion that apparently exists on the Court as
to the effect, if any, of the commerce clause on state market
participation. The close decisions in Alexandria Scrap and
Reeves, combined with the major shifts in voting between
the two, indicate that the question is far from resolved and
that the states do not have clear guidance as to what extent
their participation in the private market will be immune
from commerce clause prohibitions.
Reeves clearly raised the-issue of state control of natural
resources through proprietary means. Unfortunately, the
Court chose not to examine that issue." Surely the states
have not been given a blueprint for avoiding the commerce
clause proscriptions against hoarding natural resources, but
neither have they been given any meaningful limits to the
realm within which they can operate free from such proscriptions.
Why the Court abandoned traditional commerce clause
analysis is not entirely clear. That analysis would allow the
Court to balance considerations of state innovation and
sovereignty against the national concern for free trade
among the states."3 It is likely that the Court was reluctant
to apply the rule of per se invalidity to South Dakota's
clearly discriminatory action since state tax dollars initially
funded the cement plant." That consideration diminishes
in importance, however, in view of the fact that the cement
plant had been self-supporting for many years."
The consideration of tax support could have received its
due without excepting all state market participation from
commerce clause review. The Court conceivably could have
used Alexandria Scrap as a justification for removing discriminatory state market activity from the per se invalidity
rule," and then scrutinized the activity under the traditional
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 2281.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., supra note 17,
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra note 15,
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, supra note 2, at 2285
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra note 15,

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss1/5
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Pike balancing test."1 That type of limited exception, with
proper deference to the states in the balancing process, could
protect the states' legitimate interest in their natural resources, innovations, and expenditures, but would prevent
purely protectionist activity from escaping review. In Reeves,
however, the Court chose instead merely to follow without
limitation a precedent whose own author felt was not controlling."8
RECONSIDERATION OF REEVEs' ARGUMENTS

Reeves' Detrimental Reliance
In support of its commerce clause challenge, Reeves
argued that in time of shortage South Dakota could not
withdraw from the interstate market that it had plied for
many years." The Court rejected that argument as implying
that South Dakota could not have favored its residents from
the day the plant opened, even though such action would
clearly be permissible. That situation, argued the Court,
was indistinguishable from the change in policy that actually
occurred in Reeves. 0
Initially, it must be emphasized that the South Dakota
Cement Plant was the only one in that state and sold some
forty percent of its production out of state.4' Whether private
enterprise would have provided the difference had South
Dakota maintained a "residents only" policy from the outset
is impossible to determine ;42 nevertheless, it is evident that
South Dakota profited greatly from its position as the only
supplier in the region. In good times, the state sold its
cement to non-residents, insuring that the plant was selfsupporting and not a burden on South Dakota taxpayers; 43
37. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., supra note 17. at 142. See text accompanying
note 17, supra. Even though the South Dakota policy discriminates, the
Court could simply inquire whether the regulation serves a legitimate local
purpose, and whether the purpose could be served as well with less discriminatory means.
38. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, supra note 2, at 2283 (dissenting opinion).
39. Brief for Petitioner at 25, Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, supra note 2, at 2279.
40. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, supra note 2, at 2279.
41. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 7.
42. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, supra note 2, at 2282.
43. Id. at 2285 n. 3 (dissenting opinion).
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while in times of shortage, it erected a barrier to interstate
trade, insuring that South Dakota taxpayers received maximum benefits from the plant.
Furthermore, the Court paid no heed to the explicit
reservation that Justice Powell made in Alexandria Scrap.
We also note that appellee undertook to build no
new plant nor add additional machinery in reliance
upon . . . the Maryland bounty scheme. . .. We

intimate no view as to the consequences, if any, in a
Commerce Clause case of a different state of facts
in this respect."'
The Court in disputing another of Reeves' arguments emphasized that Reeves' very existence and continued operation for twenty years depended upon the South Dakota
Cement Plant.45 In reliance on the expectation of purchasing
cement from the South Dakota Cement Plant, Reeves had
invested about $3,000,000 in "plant equipment, supplies,
facilities and material sources" since 1958.4" In that same
period, Reeves purchased about ninety-five percent of its
cement from the plant and provided over fifty percent of
the ready mix concrete for three Wyoming counties."7 When
South Dakota refused to sell cement to it as a non-resident,
Reeves was forced to cut his production by seventy-six percent. In view of the degree of reliance, Justice Powell's
admonition in Alexandria ScraA, and his subsequent dissent
in Reeves, the Court should not have summarily dismissed
Reeves' reliance argument as "self serving."4
Finally, if the Court "balanced" interests, with reliance
as one of the factors to consider, a state policy that preferred
residents from the outset would not necessarily be void. The
Court could use Alexandria Scrap to avoid the rule of per se
invalidity, and then use the Pike test to balance the degree
of burden against the legitimate local purpose. If the state
sold only to residents from the outset, the balance would
44. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., supra note 4, at 809 n. 18.
45. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, upra note 2, at 2282.

46. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, No. 78-5060 (D.S.D. July

21, 1978).
47. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, supra note 2, at 2275.
48. Id. at 2279.
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most likely be struck in favor of the state. With no prior
reliance, the degree of burden on interstate commerce would
actually be slight despite the discrimination; the local purpose would be legitimate and could not be achieved as well
without discrimination. Once the state exploits the interstate
market, however, the legitimacy of the local purpose becomes
attenuated, the degree of burden increases, and the state
can promote its purpose with less discrimination; for example, it could first supply projects of the State of South
Dakota before selling to any private interests."'
If the Court exempted state market participation from
the per se invalidity rule, a state would still be free to try
social and economic experiments in solving local problems;
by subjecting the actions to a balancing test, the Court could
insure that such experiments were indeed "without risk to
the rest of the country.""0 By failing to limit Reeves and
Alexandria Scrap, the Court instead has encouraged states
to engage in experiments in economic protectionism and
resource hoarding free from commerce clause scrutiny.
Hoarding of Natural Resources
Reeves also argued that if South Dakota's action were
approved, other states would be encouraged to follow its
plan and isolate themselves from national energy and other
natural resource shortages." The Court responded that
cement is not a natural resource, but "the end-product of a
complex process whereby a costly physical plant and human
labor act on raw materials."" The Court reasoned that the
limestone used to make cement was the essential natural
resource and South Dakota had not limited access to it."
The Court intimated that limits to the Reeves and Alexandria
Scrap exemption might exist to prevent a state from invoking
them to hoard natural resources, but it proposed no limits
and simply stated that none would apply to the Reeves
situation."
49. Id. at 2286 (dissenting opinion).
50. Id. at 2280, quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 811 (1932)
(dissenting opinion).
51. Brief for Petitioner, supr note 89, at 29.
52. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, supra note 2, at 2281.
53. Id. at 2281.
54. Id.
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As Justice Powell's dissent pointed out, the Court's
description of cement production describes the exploitation
of most natural resources," especially those such as crude
oil, gasified coal, shale oil, uranium, the metallic minerals,
and other natural resources that are not usable immediately
upon extraction from the earth. It is understandable that
the Court would seek to avoid giving an advisory opinion,
but by distinguishing cement from other resources 'that a
state might-actually own, the Court avoided a very important issue and offered little guidance to the states as to
permissible activity. The Court itself characterized cement
as "a finely ground manufactured mineral product." 6 It is
therefore hard to see how the Court would have issued an
advisory opinion had it discussed cement in the context of
natural -resources.
The Court's distinction between access to limestone and
access to cement is no more helpful to the states. Cutting
off the supply of cement in times of shortage is equivalent
to cutting off the supply of any natural resource." The
Court's artificial distinction leaves open numerous scenarios
of a state hoarding natural resources. that it developed and
owned. Those scenarios are logically indistinguishable from
the situation in Reeves. For example, the development of oil
shale is a complex process that is highly capital intensive
and' currently heavily dependent on government funds.
Access to oil shale and shale oil are distinct, but could a state
justifiably cut off a supply of state-pr'oduced shale oil during
a shortage on the grounds that. access to oil shale is unhindered? If limits to the Alexandria Scrap and Reeves
exemption do exist, the Court was shortsighted in failing to
enunciate any.
Economic Protectionism
The Court also rejected Reeves' argument that the South
Dakota policy' was in-valid since it' gave South Dakota purchasers an unfair advantage 'in-the interstate market." The
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

2283-84 n. 2 (dissenting opinion).'
2275 n. 2.
2284 n. 2 (dissenting opinion).
2281.
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Court reasoned that Reeves' argument necessarily implied
that a policy barring the sale of cement by South Dakota
purchasers to out-of-state purchasers would have been valid,
even though that would constitute an even greater burden
on interstate commerce." That reasoning obscured Reeves'
real argument.
Reeves argued that the policy of unconditional preference for South'Dakota made the purpose of the policy
Suspect. 0° There was no guarantee that the cement would
go to projects of importance to the people of South Dakota;
the only guarantee was that only South Dakota businesses
could purchase: cement. Under those circumstances, the
policy's main concern seemed to be economic protection for
South Dakota businesses.1 The logical implication of Reeves'
argument was not that the state should bar all interstate
resales, but that there were less discriminatory means to
effect the legitimate goal of protecting the people of South
Dakota, if that were indeed the goal."2
As the dissent noted, South Dakota could have reserved
enough cement to supply public projects before allowing
all private interests to compete for the remainder. That
action would probably be deemed an acceptable means of
achieving a-legitimate local purpose under the Pike balancing
test. 3 A policy preventing resale out of state would probably
fail that test for being an illegitimate purpose and unnecessarily discriminatory. For the same reasons, the policy of
selling only to residents would probably fail a balancing
test.0 4 It is disturbing, therefore, that such a policy was not
given any commerce clause scrutiny.
RECONSIDERATION OF THE DISSENT

The fact that Justices Powell and Stevens both dissented
in Reeves, after writing the opinions sustaining the state
discrimination in Alexandria Scrap,"5 might indicate incon59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
.64.
65.

Id.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 27.
Id.
Id. at 27-30.
accompanying note 17, supra.
See
Brieftext
for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 26-32.
See notes 9 and 22, supra.
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sistency on their part; but, it also might indicate that Reeves
extended the principle of Alexandria Scrap much beyond
what its authors envisioned. There is language in Alexandria
Scrap to substantiate both the majority opinion in Reeves
and Justice Powell's more limited interpretation in the
dissent."0 It can not be gainsaid, though, that the broad
exemption from commerce clause scrutiny the Court granted
to state market participation in Alexandria Scrap appeared
in a more unpalatable form in Reeves. That it would was
foreseeable; that the Court still did not limit the exemption
is surprising.
Application of the General Rule of Alexandria Scrap
In order to reach its decision in Reeves, the majority
operated under several assumptions that, in light of Justice
Powell's dissent, at least require greater justification than
the Court supplied. The first assumption was that the general
rule of Alexandria Scrap clearly applied to Reeves. 7 Even
though South Dakota was a market participant, Justice
Powell wrote that rather than being exempt from the commerce clause, the South Dakota "residents only" policy
represented "precisely the kind of economic protectionism
that the commerce clause was intended to prevent.""8 He
carefully emphasized, however, that "protectionism" did not
refer to state policies relating to traditional governmental
functions, such as the subsidy program n Alexandria Scrap."
Then, the author of Alexandria Scrap declared that Reeves
presented a "novel constitutional question. ' T°
According to Justice Powell, the question of whether
or not the commerce clause should apply to the state activity
in Reeves hinged not on whether South Dakota was a market
participant, but on whether its market participation was an
"integral operatio[n] in areas of traditional governmental
functions." 1 In Justice Powell's analysis, a state could enter
66. Compare, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., aupra note 4, at 809-10
with 806.
67. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, supra note 2, at 2279.
68. Id. at 2282 (dissenting opinion).
69. Id. at 2282-83 n. 1.
70. Id. at 2283.
71. Id. at 2284, quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 883, 852
(1976).
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the market to supply its own needs for operation of the
government free from commerce clause scrutiny. When a
state enters the "private market and operates a commercial
enterprise for the advantage of its private citizens," however,
the commerce clause prevents actions that unduly burden
interstate commerce." Whether Alexandria Scrap was misconstrued in Reeves, or whether Justice Powell simply was
troubled by its broad implications when applied to Reeves,
his dissent adds even more to the confusion surrounding
Reeves.
Reconciliation of Justice Powell's Opinions in Alexandria
Scrap and Reeves
Although Justice Powell definitely used broad language
to describe the Alexandria Scrap exemption, the distinctions
he made in Reeves merit attention as possible limits that
the Court may later impose. The "traditional governmental
function" distinction may be useful because in Alexandria
Scrap, Justice Powell did give some weight to Maryland's
purpose for entering the market, that of environmental
protection. Another distinction is that Alexandria Scrap
involved subsidies funded by taxation, while the South
Dakota Cement Plant was a self-supporting proprietary
entity."4 Perhaps the most significant difference, though,
was the method of discrimination.
In Alexandria Scrap, Justice Powell emphasized that
Maryland merely entered the market to bid up the price of
scrap autos and did not regulate or prohibit their flow out
of state. Nor did it require scrap autos to be processed in
state. Maryland simply made the decision to process in state
more lucrative." Maryland erected no barrier to trade,
rather, the autos remained "within Maryland in response
to market forces, including that exerted by money from the
state.""6
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.

Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., supra note 4, at 809.
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, supra note 2, at 2285 n. 3 (dissenting opinion).
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., supra note 4, at 806.
Id. at 809-810.
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.
Reeves, in contrast, dealt with an absolute state-imposed
barrier to -interstate commerce. South Dakota was indeed a
market participant, but rather than making certain market
options more attractive, it manifestly eliminated a market
option by barring sales to non-resident purchasers.",
Perhaps Justice Powell's limitations were not clearly
made in Alexandria Scrap; or, perhaps he changed his
position between the two cases. In either event, it seems
that the unqualified assertion that Reeves fell within the
general rule of Alexandria Scrap needed some further
..
Support
The State as Market Participantand Market Regulator
The Court also assumed that fairness required that the
state as a market participant should be as.. free from commerce clause restraint as a private individual.11 As Justice
Powell recognized, equating a state with any other market
participant does not account for different factors that
motivate the two. A private individual's market decisions
profits. A state's
will generally reflect a desire to maximize
goals, however, will often be political; so its market decisions
often will be politically, not economically, motivated.8 ° Those
decisions, when backed by the power of the state, have the
potential-to regulate the market and should :.not go unscrutinized."
The tools available to the states as: market participants
are much more powerful and diverse than those of a private
entity. For example, the South Dakota Constitution authorizes the legislature to "empower the state to acquire, by
purchase or appropriation, all lands, easements, rights of
way, tracts, structures, equipment ... and material necessary" tomanufacture, distribute, and sell cement." . A private
entity generally will • not have the ability to acquire the
77. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, supra note 2, at 2285-2286 (dissenting. opinion).
78. Id. at 2279.
79. Id.

80. ld.'at:2284 .(dissenting opinion).
81. Id.
82. S.D. CONST. art. XIII, § 10.

"

:
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elements of an enterprise through appropriation." In fact,
a state has a full range of police powers to aid their entry
into the free market, and if necessary, a full range of taxing
powers to keep themselves there.
With its political motivations and powers, a state is not
a mere market participant. It occupies the enviable position
of both market participant and market regulator. 4 Those
two functions merged particularly well in Reeves since South
Dakota operated the only cement plant in the state.8 " The
majority attributed little significance to the state's ability
to regulate through participation. In fact, the Court's commerce clause inquiry halted once it found market participation. 6 That degree of deference to the state was unwarranted
because "[s]tate action burdening interstate commerce is no
less state action because it is accomplished by a public
agency authorized to participate in the private market."8 7
Although the Court considered market participation sufficient to remove the action from commerce clause review,
an early principle of commerce clause review was "a state
may not, in any form or under any guise, directly burden
the prosecution of interstate business."8 8
CONCLUSION

The Court in Reeves allowed South Dakota to discriminate against out-of-state cement purchasers without submitting the state's action to traditional commerce clause
scrutiny. Even the fact that an entire region was facing
severe cement shortages was insufficient to trigger commerce
clause scrutiny. The Court justified its decision by denominating South Dakota's action "market participation" rather
than "market regulation." That ethereal distinction does not
comport with the settled principle that the "Constitution
was framed .. .upon the theory that the peoples of the
83. There are some limited private rights of eminent domain for certain public
uses, mainly to provide access to water and mines. Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-26-303
and 1-26-401 (1977).
84. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, aupra note 2, at 2284 (dissenting opinion).
85. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 7.

86. Id. at 2279.
87. Id. at 2284 (dissenting opinion).
88. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., supra note 14 at 522, quoting International
Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 112 (1910$.
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several states must sink or swim together, and that in the
long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not
division." 9
States should have freedom to experiment and provide
for their citizens, but .there is an elusive boundary beyond
which state activity is too, protectionistic to be allowed in a
unified nation. The states have just as much power to cross
that boundary as ."market participants" as they do as
"market'regulators." The commerce clause should not interfere with legitimate state experimentation, but it should
prevent protectionism. By failing to balance interests or
limit 'the Reeves exemption from- commerce clause scrutiny,
the Court- has given the states no standards by which to
make their own decision on the legitimacy of an experiment.
.LEON VANCE

_89. Badin v. G.A:F. Seelig: Inc

upra .note 14, at 523.
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